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The Complementarity of Crime and Madness

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ABSTRACT In this paper, we shall treat certain processes of crime, deviance and morbidity on the basis of Shoham's personality theory. This theory is Kleinian, mainly expounded by Fairbairn and Winnicott, as well as philosophically existentialist. We hold Kleinian psychoanalysis to be existentialist, since apart from having the basically Freudian point of departure, it is based on dialogical philosophic premises, which see object relationships as the main tenet of human existence.

Since both crime and madness relate to similar personality core aberrations, we have tried to draw the parameters that would raise the possibilities of deviance and mobility and plot a tentative model for the bifurcation towards ultimate crime or madness. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678. E-mail address: getinfo@haworthpressinc.com <Website: <http://www.haworthpressinc.com>>]

KEYWORDS Psychopathology, social pathology, deviance theory, Shoham's personality theory

INTRODUCTION: THE PERSONALITY THEORY

In this paper, we shall treat certain processes of crime, deviance and morbidity on the basis of Shoham's personality theory. This theory is Kleinian¹ mainly expounded by Fairbairn and Winnicott, as well as philosophically existentialist. We hold Kleinian psychoanalysis to be existentialist, since apart from having the basically Freudian point of departure, it is based on dialogical philosophic premises which see object relationships as the main tenet of human existence.

Shoham's personality theory envisages two core vectors: "participation" and "separation."² Participation signifies the identification of Ego with external entities: persons, objects, or symbolic constructs, and its efforts to lose its separate identity by fusion with this entity. Separation is the opposite vector. These two vectors, in conjunction with three major phases of development, or separation, form the main axis of this personality theory. The first developmental phase is the process of birth. The second is the crystallization of an individual ego by the molding of an "ego boundary." The third developmental phase is a corollary of socialization, when one's "ego identity" is reached. The urge to overcome separating pressures never leaves the human individual. If one avenue towards its realization is blocked, it surges out through another channel. Actual participation is unattainable by definition. The objective impossibility of participation is augmented by the countering separating vectors, both instinctual and interactive. At any given moment in life there would be a disjuncture, a gap, between our desire for participation and our subjectively defined distance from our participatory aims. The coagulation of the self marks the cutoff point for this most basic developmental dichotomy.

Two separate developmental phases are noted: from birth to formation of the ego boundary around the emerging individual *separatum* this phase includes early orality, and then from later orality onwards. In the first phase, a potential fixation-causing trauma is registered by a separate self, capable of discerning between objects that are the sources of that trauma and itself as

recipient. The self that experiences such an event is a non-differentiated totality. If, however, the potentially fixating event occurs at the later oral phase, the self may well be in a position to attribute the cause of pain and deprivation to its proper source—the external objects.

The molding process determines the nature and severity of fixation, which in turn determines the placement of a given individual on a personality-type continuum. However, the types themselves are fixed according to developmental chronology: the *participant*, at pre-differentiated early orality and the *separant* after the formation of the separate self. The participant core vector operates with varying degrees of potency on both personality types, but the quest for harmony manifests itself differently with each polar personality type. The participant aims to achieve harmony by effacing, by annihilating himself; that is, by melting back into the object and achieving the togetherness and non-differentiation of early orality. The inclination toward harmony of the self-effacing participant is denoted Tantallic, and that of the object-devouring separant as Sisyphic.

In *Salvation Through the Gutters*,³ we showed that the fetus at birth is fully capable of registering the enormity of the shock of its expulsion from the womb, both physically and mentally. In *Birth Without Violence* (1975), F. Leboyer describes the infernal experiences of the neonate during birth and just after thus:

Hell exists, and is white hot. It is not a fable. But we go through it at the beginning of our lives, not the end. Hell is what the child goes through to reach us. Its flames assail the child from every side; they burn its eyes, its skin, they sear its flesh; they devour. This fire is what the baby feels as the air rushes into the lungs. The air, which enters and sweeps through the trachea and expands the alveoli, is like acid poured on a wound. (p. 69)

The transition from the womb to the outside world is violent in all respects—the need to breathe oxygen instead of receiving it directly from the mother, the need to seek food and digest it, and the exposure to changing temperature and hard objects, instead of the constant warmth and cushioned resilient walls of the uterus. Expulsion from the womb also involves a period, of varying intensity and length, of being squeezed and pushed into the narrow, inflexible birth canal, which causes the neonate pain. The shock of birth is mercifully not remembered, as a necessary defense against the intense pain and psychic traumata it involves, but it is undoubtedly registered by our sub- or preconscious. The newborn feels omnipresent and hence omnipotent, because at this stage of life he cannot be aware of anything or anybody but himself. Yet in his omnipresent egocentricity, the newborn experiences a disastrous catapulting from blissful self-sufficiency into painful, troubled, and hostile surroundings not far removed from the mythical characteristics of hell.

Psychologically, the pantheistic neonate learns by deprivational interaction with surrounding objects and life forms, especially with his mother or her surrogate. They cannot fulfill all his wishes immediately and automatically as in the womb; the neonate learns he is not “with” but “against” everything. The moment this awareness is embodied in the scar tissue of the delimiting, individual “ego boundary,” pantheistic, participant togetherness gives way to the loneliness and encapsulated existence of the individualized human *separatum*. This separation, the existential coagulation of the individual self, is also perceived by the organism as a catastrophe. The formation of a separate self, occurring in the middle of the oral phase of development and marking the division between early and later orality, is gradual. It is a transformation along a continuum, from a sense of partaking of a totality to a feeling of separant individuation.

Sexuality necessitates the crystallization of a separate self; it requires relating, by the self, to an alter or object in its surrounding. A duality, or plurality, is necessary for sexuality to achieve its affective and/or physical dyadic intercourse. The theoretical cycle here seems to be completed, in that sex is both one of the aims of and a major factor in the separant ejection of the nascent self from pantheistic early orality.

At early orality the “mouth-ego” interacts with the breast-mother in a binary manner. If the breast does not sprout forth milk the “mouth-ego” suffers, but imputes the pain and “badness” to itself; at this stage, the nascent ego is not yet crystallized as a different entity and whatever happens occurs within the omnipresent self. However, the “good” breast-mother who supplies food to the mouth-ego does hover somewhere on the boundaries of its omnipresence. Pain, hunger, thirst may be perceived by the infant as happening within himself, but the milk flows from outside and is sucked in by the mouth-ego. We shall elaborate later on the premise that the child feels sexual excitement while sucking its mother’s breast, as does the mother. The mother, however, suppresses this sexual excitement, because she conceives it as incestuous. This suppression of sexual excitement is transmitted by the mother to her nursing child through intuitive empathy and direct, tactile, nonverbal communication. This creates a severe conflict in the mouth-ego. The “good” breast-mother feeds the infant and makes him very happy indeed, because food at this stage is the early oral child’s main concern. But with food comes a message of proscription and suppression of what is experienced as a very arousing sensation. Such proscription (i.e., “badness”) cannot come from the “good” food itself and not from the “good” breast-mother who provides it. Hence, the mytho-empirical projection imputed to a vile entity the proscribed outside and therefore vile sexual experience, which accompanies the sucking of food and that hence pollutes it.


The ego-mouth receives a dual message from the breast-mother: first, its

sexual arousal while suckling is vile; second, her sexual desire aroused by its sucking her nipple is transmitted to him by empathy and direct, tactile, nonverbal communication, together with her suppression of it. These sexual dialectics at early orality are an additional separant process that along with the deprivational and conflictual interaction of the neonate with its surroundings, effect the crystallization of the individual self and its ejection from the pantheistic togetherness of early orality.

Klein, Fairbairn and to some extent Abraham have rightly imputed an overwhelming importance to oral eroticism in the structuring of character and personality. Yet their theories and descriptions relating to early and later orality, sucking and biting, “emptying” the breast-mother or being deprived by it, lacked clarity and circumspection, because they did not provide clear-cut criteria for distinguishing between early and later orality. This was done in *Salvation through the Gutters*⁴ and in *The Myth of Tantalus*⁵ by positing the coagulation of the separate self as the dividing line between early and later orality. Before the separation, everything happens within the pantheistic, omnipresent mouth-ego. However, after the separate ego boundary forms around the mouth-ego it gains the depriving breast-mother and surrounding objects are identified as such by the nascent ego and treated accordingly. Fixation at early orality then may be clearly related to a pantheistic unity of the self, others, and objects, whereas fixation at later orality is anchored on a distinct self, others, and objects.

The dynamics of harmony or congruity can operate, then, either by separant inclusion, through which the mouth-ego aims to swallow and incorporate the breast-mother or external object, or by participant exclusion, by which the ego-mouth aims to efface and annihilate itself, so that it can melt back into the object and fuse with the breast-mother. These dynamics lead to the formation of a personality core continuum arising out of the deprivational interaction between mouth-ego and breast-mother along the lines indicated in Figure 1 below. The mother axis has at one extreme the absent mother, Genet-type foundling who grows up in institutions with very little care, where the surro-

□ **Figure 1: Good Me-Bad Me**



gate breast is the nipple of a bottle provided erratically and sometimes carelessly, and the surrogate mother is the fleeting image of the passing nurse. The other extreme is represented by the rejecting mother. This includes a wide range of maternal attitudes: from the openly rejecting to the frustrating mother who does not fulfill the infant's needs for nourishment and comfort, and is consequently perceived by the child as hating and rejecting. The indifferent mother is one who is physically or mentally incapacitated, or one who is overburdened with children and work and is physically present, but emotionally tried and detached. This mother axis represents, of course, a "skewed" and anomalous continuum of maternal attitudes, because more or less "normal" maternal care does not predispose the infant to morbidity.

To recapitulate, at one extreme of the child axis is the negative (bad me) ego boundary surrounded by the good object (mother). At the very early oral stage, described by Freud as primary narcissism, by Fairbairn as "mouth ego with a breast," and in this work as omnipresent pantheism, the mouth feeds on (empties) the breast and is temporarily content. However, disturbances in feeding and related irritations generate the agony of want and pains of anxiety. Consequently, says Fairbairn, the infant infers that its feeding destroyed the nourishing, comforting breast. This is not tenable. At the very early oral stage, the "mouth-entity" is not capable of problem solving, and moreover, the "me-object" dichotomy does not yet exist. Therefore any pain, anxiety, and want that occur are in me, and only in me, because I am omnipresent; there is nothing except the mouth-anchored me. Consequently, a fixation at the early oral phase results in the registration of a painful wanting (bad) self and a nourishing (good) being somewhere in the vague, uncharted outside-of-self, which is, at this stage of awareness, outside of everything. What is present is a painful aching self. The nourishing and soothing goodness that was previously the self, is absent out there, hovering evidently out of reach. An early oral fixation is therefore a "bad me" surrounded by the "good" (nourishing) object.

At the other extreme of the child axis is the good self, surrounded by the bad object (mother). The later stage of oral development is characterized by a partial differentiation of the infant from the mother and the development of ambivalence toward her manifested, *inter alia*, by the child's biting of the breast in its moments of aggression. Here again we add an observation concerning later fixation: The emerging separation of the self, due to the deprivational interaction with the mother, creates an easily accessible source and sequential explanation of the frustration, deprivation, and anxieties of the infant. The non-caring, non-feeding mother who is already separate from the suffering (good) self is all apparent and very often in front of the child's mouth. This location of responsibility is accentuated by the vengeful bite.⁶

The separation of an individual self surrounded by an ego boundary is hence concomitant with the dialectics of a good-bad self and good-bad mother.

After early orality man is separate from his objective and human surroundings. His omnipresent structure in pantheistic, early orality was reduced to the size of an individual and, hence, rather insignificant separatum. This abrupt transformation from an all-engulfing unity to only another item among a myriad of pluralities contributes greatly to a catastrophic feeling of a fall. This separation of creation from boundless infinity is absolute. The way back to it, as decreed by the separant vector, is impossible. Man is trapped within space, time, and causality and cannot even conceive boundless infinity.

The third phase of separation is socio-normative indoctrination, marked by the imposition of social responsibilities and rites of passage, marking the transition from forgivingness of childhood to the burdens of adulthood. In most cultures the father or his surrogate is the doctrinaire figure instrumental in imposing norms and duties on both his sons and daughters, and preparing them for their proper social roles. Induction of a son into the compulsion and duties of the normative social system by his father has been described elsewhere as the "Isaac Syndrome"⁷ and will be adapted to the present context.

Thus, the first victimization of the child at later orality is maternal, blocking the free expression of its incestuous desires, whereas the second is parental, harnessing, even coercing, the child into the normative system of society, of which the father is deemed to be the agent within the family. Usually this coercive, normative victimization is backed by the absolute authority of God, the fatherland, or the secular deity of materialist dialectics. As in the model of the offering of Isaac, there is usually a symbiotic relationship between the stern, doctrinaire father and a metaphysical source of absolute authority. It is important to note that such continuing victimization by parents, from early orality onwards, is an integral part of the separant processes of development and socialization. Maternal victimization at later orality leads to Sisyphean sublimation towards culture creativity, while paternal victimization at that stage leads to the separant insertion of the pubescent individual within a normative pigeonhole sanctioned by society. At this stage, however, the mother is the symbol of grace. She stands for the careless participant longing for the forgiveness and lack of responsibility of children within the family, prior to their being harnessed within the normative burdens of society through the doctrinaire authority of the father. In some tribes, the rite of passage from childhood to puberty (circumcision) is presided over by the elders, while the mothers join in the wailing of their aching, suffering sons.⁸

The Isaac Syndrome has been presented as the normative, parental aggression against children, countering the Oedipal pressures of children against their father. The main thrust, however, of the story of Isaac is the sacrificial enmeshing of the young into the disciplinarian boundaries of the normative

social system. All normative initiation involves varying measures of sacrificial curbing of the well-being and freedom of the pubescent young in favor of the group. Such sacrificial indoctrination is performed by the father as the intermediary between the young and the social rules that are sustained through his authority, by secular or divine transcendence.

The most striking feminine parallel to the Isaac Syndrome, replete with the gory sacrificial details and wide socio-normative implications, is the sacrifice of Iphigenia to the exigencies of socio-religious commands, through the authoritarian agency of her father, Agamemnon. Iphigenia is sacrificed to the glory of the group and its patriotic honor, an extension of Agamemnon's own glory, as the way the normative power of Divinity is the extension of the authority of Abraham. Unlike Abraham, who never doubted the command of God, Agamemnon waivers and rages against the need to sacrifice his daughter for the glory of the army, for the honor of the mob. This stems from the differences between the Judaic and Hellenic conceptions of divine authority. For Abraham, God's commands are the epitome of justice, not to be doubted nor questioned, whereas the anthropomorphic Greek gods make no pretense of being just, yet they know that they are the pronounces of *ananke* (necessity) and *moira* (fate), the prime movers of the Greek religion and normative system. The outcome, however, is the same: Both Isaac and Iphigenia are sacrificed to the divine projections of socio-normative mandates. Iphigenia was not as willing a victim as Isaac, who according to the Midrash ran joyfully to the altar and bound himself.⁹ Iphigenia pleaded with Agamemnon, in one of the most shattering monologues in world drama. From Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis*, in *The Complete Greek Drama* (New York: Random House, 1938):

Had I the voice of Orpheus, O my father,
 If I could sing so that the rocks would move,
 If I had words to win the hearts of all,
 I would have used them. I have only tears.
 See, I have brought them! They are all my power.
 I clasp your knees, I am your suppliant now,
 I, your own child; my mother bore me to you.
 O, kill me not untimely! The sun is sweet!
 Why will you send me into the dark grave,
 I was the first to sit upon your knee,
 The first to call you father . . . (p. 323)

At the end, however, she accepts her fate and goes to the altar with a patriotic announcement: "Bid my father come and torch the altar. I will bring this day victory and salvation unto Greece" (p. 334).

Finally, like Sarah in the Isaac myth, Clytemnestra, Iphigenia's mother, is

the figure of grace, condemning paternal cruelty as expressed in the divine mandate to sacrifice her daughter for the glory of Greece.

THE UNFULFILLED DIALECTIC

Participation with one's surroundings is problematic, because Ego's interaction with objects and life forms is mostly conflictual and always dialectical. A non-dialogical *Ity* relationship with other people is petrifying, and an I-thou dialogue borders, according to Buber, on the miraculous. A creative relationship with an object may effect an *extasis*, in the Greek sense, of the creator's spirit from time and space, and lend him a feeling of union with the object. However, such a feeling is completely within Ego's psyche, and regardless of his initial creative quests, they are bound to be different dialectically in their synthetic outcome. This is the fate of all Sisyphean endeavors directed towards the outside.

The dialectical quest of the vectors—the things-in-themselves—which are the prime movers of objects and life forms, cannot be apparent. Only the clashes and synthetic outcomes of the dialectical interaction constitute apparent reality, the contours and forms of matter, and the system-in-balance of life forms and personality. When the synthetic outcome of each dialectical cycle initiates another cycle, it slips again into “nonbeing,” only to reappear again into the “being” of reality as the synthesis of another dialectical cycle *da capo*, in an endless dialectical Sisyphean-Tantalus process. Hence, the dialectical interaction of the teleological, nonrealizable quests of the core vectors provide the basic energy and the prime movers of “being,” as well as the systems-in-balance of life.

As we ever crave for what we are not and for what we do not have, we are living in inauthentic time. The separant vector aims for the future, while the participant longs for the past. When dominated by these two vectors, man does not exist in the present; his life is therefore a nonentity, false and inauthentic. If the quests and longings inherent in his core personality vectors cannot be fulfilled, there is an inevitable and constant rift between man's aspirations and expectations on the one hand, and his perceived reality on the other. Hence, man is ever confronted with the absurd. Such dual impasse of inauthenticity and the absurd make the myths of Sisyphus and Tantalus so central to the human condition that they can rightly be considered metamyths. The initial inauthenticity of man's existence in the world, and his inevitable experience of the absurd, constitute his existential impasse, from which creativity and revelation are able to extricate him. Creativity thus constitutes the *modus vivendi* of Sisyphus with his stone burden, and revelation is the means by which Tantalus can go on living within his predicament. Man thus starts as an initial failure, yet through his ability to sublimate his unrealized quests

into creativity and revelation, he is able to transform that initial impasse into authentic experience and authentic existence. It seems that our programmer, whoever or whatever it is—God, chance, evolution, or the devil—programmed us to yearn to achieve goals that can never be achieved. To yearn to be different from what we are at a given time and place, and not to cherish the present but to long either for earlier developmental phases, for a past state of nonbeing, or the away-and-beyond of the future. Our programmer intends, apparently, to see how our Sisyphean quests, which cannot be fulfilled, and our impossible Tantallic longings, could be sublimated dialectically into creativity and revelation.

Both the separant and the participant need to sustain their quests and their longings in order to be creative and revelatory. Both creativity and revelation are dynamic processes fueled by Sisyphean aims and Tantallic longings that can never be fulfilled. If they are, our yearnings are extinguished, and our potential for authentic being through creativity and revelation die with them. The impasse of unfulfilled aims and the inevitable, absurd rift between our expectations and reality are transformed from a curse to a blessing. Moreover, the dialectics between our unfulfilled Sisyphean quests and Tantallic longings are our prime movers—without them we are dead.

Revelation is not transferable, but through creativity the revelatory insight of the creator becomes communicable. Moreover, the work of art becomes the vehicle through which the revelation of the artist is transferred to his audience. This revelation, inherent in a work of art, also becomes a measure of its timelessness and hence, of its lasting value; revelation transcends the sequences of time; effecting a temporal *extasis*, both of the artist and his audience.

The participation vector has been conceived as the quest of the individual at every particular moment of his life to revert to an earlier developmental phase: to the irresponsibility of prepuberty, to the grace of mother and the protection of the family fold, to the pantheistic omnipresence of early orality and the prenatal bliss of nonbeing. These are countered by the instinctual and deprivational quests of the separation vector, which, except in the case of death, always has the upper hand. Yet the quest for participatory nonbeing is ever present, and we tend to agree with the hypothesis that if man possessed a special master switch by means of which he could end his life, he would be bound to do so at one time or another. This also justifies Camus's stance that the only valid philosophical question is whether or not to commit suicide.¹⁰ It has been pointed out elsewhere that the quest for participation manifested itself in numerous sublimatory substitutes, both normative and deviant,¹¹ but actual participation is unattainable by definition. A writer such as Proust can *receive* a lost childhood and graceful mother with acute sensitivity, through the hazy memories triggered by the taste of madeleine biscuit; but even he

cannot recapture the actual sensations of things past. We are forever looking for our lost childhood, for our narcissistic paradise, but no one can actually revert to prepuberty, reconstruct the eccentric omnipresence of early orality, or revive the sensations of blissful suspended animation in the amniotic fluid of the uterus. Participation is, therefore, a *fata morgana*, shining hazily before one's craving eyes, ever receding, never achieved. The objective impossibility of participation is augmented by the countering separant vectors, both instinctual and interactive. At any given moment, there would be a disjuncture, a gap, between our desire for participation and our subjectively defined distance from our participatory aims. This gap has been denoted the Tantalus Ratio, after the Olympian demigod who, whenever he reached for fruit, would have it whirled out of his reach by a gust of wind, and when he bent down to drink from a seemingly fresh, sparkling stream of water, it turned out to be black mud. Even when he succeeded in scooping up some water in his palm, it sifted through his fingers before he could cool his parched lips.¹² This Tantalus Ratio, the relationship between a longed-for participatory goal and the distance from it as perceived by Ego, is dependent, *inter alia*, on the following factors:

1. The strength of the participatory vectors, as determined by the distance in time from the developmental stages of birth, and the formation of the ego boundary, and ego identity.
2. The fixations, in the Freudian sense, that Ego might have experienced in the various developmental stages. These fixations would also be linked to the nature and intensity of Ego's deprivational interaction with its entourage and relevant others. These fixations would underline a personality typology continuum, denoted at the extreme as *object oriented* and *idea centered* on the other. The continuum would, no doubt, be linked to the vast number of existing dichotomous personality continua that have been constructed and measured by personologists.
3. The given culture in which the individual is reared: whether it tends to be a "tool oriented" society of doers, or a "symbol oriented" culture that encourages mysticism, meditation and quietism.
4. The residual unknown quality of variables, both on the personality and cultural levels, that affect the participatory and separating vectors and consequently, the Tantalus Ratio, which cannot be determined at this theory-building stage.

The gap represented by the Tantalus Ratio creates a strain, a tension between the longing for participation and the distance from it as perceived by Ego. This strain, the intensity of which is determined by the factors comprising the Tantalus Ratio, is the motivating force underlying Ego's action. It is generated within synoptic junction of these opposing vectors and the tension

is related to Ego's motivational movement toward some participatory goals or their sublimated alternative. In other words, the participatory and separatory vectors comprise the crude psychic energy, whereas the gap related to the Tantalus Ratio and the strain generated by it provide the motivational direction for Ego's actual behavior. This strain may be either conscious or unconscious, and its operation is regulated by social norms from without and by some internal homeostasis mechanism. These personality homeostasis mechanisms are not necessarily linked to the biological ones. Our hypothesis is that the psychic bases that underline these homeostasis mechanisms are generated by anxieties registered by each consecutive stage of development. Each developmental stage from birth onward is experienced by Ego as a painful separation accompanied by a deprivational interaction with his surroundings. The personality clings to its present stability, because each developmental change was for the worse, leading to more radical separateness. The psychic homeostasis mechanisms are, therefore, "the evil I know" defenses, which make the personality adhere to stable states as lesser evils.

We have already mentioned that the reversal to previous developmental stages is a practical impossibility, but all the techniques of participation, both normative and deviant, are a far cry from the intense longing for participation fueled by Ego's memories of earlier, participatory, stages. Thus, the tension inherent in the Tantalus Ratio generates formidable energies that are constantly augmented and kindled by the impossibility of quenching Ego's thirst for participation.

As the goals of neither the Sisyphean nor Tantallic core vectors can be achieved, the only epistemic reality is the dialectic interaction between the nonrealizable separant quest and equally unattainable, participant longing. Because Sisyphean quests face the future and Tantallic longing aims at the past, man is in an absurd impasse, within inauthentic time without a present. Creativity and revelation are therefore meant to extricate man from this impasse. Those who cannot be creative or revelatory also try to escape their absurd and oppressive reality by entertainment, fantasy, or daydreaming, which feed passively, with or without the aid of alcohol or drugs, on their pent-up yearnings. The dialectics of our yearning thus provide the fuel and energy with which Ego can emerge from its inauthentic slumber and interact with objects and human surroundings. Moreover, as the dialectics between Sisyphean quests and Tantallic longings constitute the epistemic processes underlying apparent reality, they are the prime movers of life and creation. Without the dialectics of yearning, both Ego and its surroundings would be nonexistent.

When a man is young, he still has hopes for realizing his Tantallic longing and Sisyphean quests. However, with age, he realizes his quests are not attainable, and that he must make do with the dialectics between them; the quests can sustain him without their being fulfilled. Hence, the dialectical

quests that generate mental energy, denoted the Tantalus Ratio, are most powerful at the outset of life and decrease in potency with each developmental phase, until they wane to a low ebb in old age. The strength of the Tantalus Ratio is related first of all to the enormity of the separating forces in early childhood, which cause the participation vectors to muster contrary pressures of corresponding potency. Second, recent developmental events, of a separative impact, make for vivid memories and sharply focused images of the lost participatory bliss. The child's frantic efforts to regain that bliss would therefore be marked by a desperate surge of power to reverse the new grief of the recent developmental calamity. These efforts are not yet mellowed or weakened by the sad knowledge, which comes with experience, that direct participatory reversals are impossible. The separation of birth, registered by the neonate as a catastrophe,¹³ as a cosmic breaking of the vessels, is marked by frantic efforts to survive. The mouth-ego of the infant searches for the nipple, or anything that can spurt nourishment. This, and the enormous pressures of growth at this hectic developmental phase, constitute the biological vectors of separation that are at the height of their potency. And yet this is also the stage when the neonate has the strongest craving to revert back to his mother's womb, from which he was just a while ago so brutally expelled into an experience where the mere effort to survive is painful. This is in keeping with what Schachtel has denoted as the Law of Embeddedness: "The more complete the *state of embeddedness of the organism to any change* in the significant environment, the less does the organism want to stir from a state of quiescent equilibrium in relation to the environment."¹⁴ This means that the more violent the separating disturbance, the more powerful the corresponding striving for participation. And what is more violent than the separating expulsion of birth? Indeed, what Herman, Bowlby and the *ethnologists* have denoted as the "instinct of clinging" of primate neonates to their mothers,¹⁵ as well as the less corporeal attachment of the human infant to his mother or mother surrogate, could be linked to his desire to regain the physical union with her, *in utero*. This could be the underlying motive for the clinging behavior of both primate and human infants, apart from the functional desire of the young to be close to their source of nourishment and protection.¹⁶

The second major phase of separation, the coagulation of the distinct "I," the separate ego boundary, is marked by the introduction of the deprivational interaction with the external object, at the oral stage, the mother, the breast, the nipple—into the Tantalus Ratio. Indeed, we have described elsewhere how the ego boundary that separates the self from the pantheistic omnipresence of early orality is nothing but the scar tissue that surrounds the *separatum*, as a result of its deprivational interaction with its surrounding objects. The participation vectors are harnessed by the emerging self to counter the separating effects of the deprivational interaction that join forces with the processes of growth.

We have relied elsewhere on the “oralist” offshoot of psychoanalysis, which describes the mouth-ego of early orality aiming to empty the object (breast), whereas at the later, “biting,” oral stage, the mouth-ego wishes to destroy in its fits of rage the nonobliging mother-object.¹⁷ Apart from the need for fulfillment and other developmental connotations that these urges to empty and destroy the object have, they may be attributed to participatory functions. The mouth-ego at early orality aims to swallow the object, so that its pantheistic omnipresence is regained. At the later oral phase, when the infant’s deprivational interaction with the object pushes it into developing a separate self, the destruction of the object by biting—the sole weapon that the mouth-ego possesses—is aimed at *countering* this deprivational interaction by elimination of the object. Moreover, when the depriving object is destroyed, the narcissistic mouth-ego reigns supreme, its omnipresence regained. Consequently, the Tantalus Ratio at the stage of crystallization of the self is very potent indeed. One of the “participation surrogates,” expressed in the pent-up tension of the Tantalus Ratio, is the extreme egocentricity of the child, which is a prolongation of the narcissistic omnipresence of early orality. This egocentrism lasts, according to Piaget, up to the age of seven.¹⁸ But here again the participatory vectors are fighting a losing battle, because egocentricity is confronted by the counterpresence of the socializers, who make it their duty to drive home to the child that “he is not alone in the world,” that “one must be considerate of others,” that “one must take the point of view of others into account.” This deprivational (from Ego’s point of view) socialization eventually gains the upper hand, until the young adult is extruded from the protection of the family fold and expelled by an endless variety of rites of passage to the final separation of adulthood. The participation vectors counter this separation by an intense longing for the graceful forgivingness of the mother and irresponsibility within the family fold. Most childhood memories become pleasantly idyllic, harsh and painful experiences largely repressed. It may be noted that we do not rely on the oedipal process as an explanation of normative indoctrination through the introjection of the father as a source of authority. We tend to agree here with Melanie Klein and Ronald Fairbairn,¹⁹ who claim that guilt and a conscience may be acquired at a very early stage of development; they do not point out the need for the resolution of the Oedipal complex as a source for normative indoctrination. Social separation is achieved by the enmeshing of the individual within a normative cocoon, by the parents and socializing agencies, within this personal space allotted to him by the normative system. The individual *separatum* is expected to mate and assume his proper place as a responsible citizen/subject/comrade in society. This is the social involvement decreed by every human society to its individual members. Each group either ascribes or expects from its members to fulfill certain positions within its structure.

Such social involvement, sanctioned by the normative system of the group and ingrained into the individual by the deprivational interaction of socialization, is, no doubt, an advanced stage of separation. Yet the Tantalus Ratio has enough tension stored to send the individual off to some arduous "participation surrogates." These are rather like Freud's "defenses," i.e., modes of release of libidinal energy, the direct satisfaction of which is blocked. For Freud, most but not all human behavior is "defensive," because some instinctual needs are directly fulfilled; but according to him, there cannot be any actual or direct participation, so that the ever-present quest for participation, although varying in potency, is always expressed by surrogates. We mentioned previously one such participation surrogate, i.e., the egocentricity of the child, as an alternative to the pantheistic omnipresence of early orality.

THE DISRUPTION OF A PERSONALITY

Now that we have presented our personality theory, we are in a position to show how a given personality structure could go wrong.

We must stress that our interest at this stage is on the level of a predisposition to crime; both crime and morbidity have a predisposition followed by a kind of a triggering process which makes the predisposition, so to speak, "flower" into the phenomenon. This had been noted many years ago by Freud, in his *Mourning and Melancholia*,²⁰ where he expounded the predisposition to depression, which becomes a full-fledged depression only after loss or a severe blow. Likewise, in psychosis we also envisage a predisposition and then a trigger which actuates the phenomenon. The same holds for crime. We have pointed out that there is a predisposition to crime, followed by the chain process of association, learning and absorption of the patterns of crime. The predisposition and the triggering dynamics are complementary processes. Hence, we stress that our interest at this stage is only to try and alienate the similarities and divergence between crime and madness, on the personality level, concentrating on three predisposing factors and processes.

In order to ask how a personality "goes wrong," we have devised the models outlined below, which relate to the child and mother axes, as related to crime and madness.

The external manifestation of delinquency and schizophrenia are widely different. However, there is a similarity that begins on a previous level of analysis—when early socialization is still rather close to the point of bifurcation into predisposition to social deviance or functional psychosis. First of all, the etiology schemes themselves are quite similar in their structure. Schizophrenia is believed to develop by a feedback cycle triggered by loss, deprivation or other personal tragedies in the vulnerable transitory periods of the childhood, adolescence, etc. However, a predisposition to psychosis that had

crystallized, presumably, in early childhood, has to be present for the later event to catalyze the onset of schizophrenia. Similarly in criminology, some hypothesize that a predisposition to delinquency is incurred by a youth growing up in a broken or inadequate family, in neighborhoods of high delinquency rates, and in societies suffering from normative disintegration (anomie). These factors, which ideally should be expressed in probabilistic terms, raise the chances that an individual will be initiated into the life of crime through later dynamic processes of role-playing and association.

The similarity becomes rather striking when we compare some major trends in criminology and the recent theoretical expositions on schizophrenia. The main currents in criminological theory link most criminal or socially deviant behavior to learning processes.²¹ One may be socialized in some cases by criminal parents, siblings or even whole communities, like criminal Indian tribes. In most cases, however, the learning of criminal and deviant patterns of behavior is preceded by rejection of legal structures and alienation from the prevailing value system. As in criminology theory, no unequivocal physiological correlates have been firmly established as a cause of the functional psychoses. The significantly high incidence of schizophrenia in families raised by the children or siblings of schizophrenics could quite readily be explained by the transmission of ego defects in early socialization.²² That is, such defects could be transmitted by the internalization through learning of parents' faulty patterns of interaction, or even by the general breakdown in communication within a "schizophrenic" family.²³ Conversely, a boy growing up in a criminal family such as the "notorious Jukes" would have to be disturbed indeed to become a clergyman.

A seemingly more complicated task would be to replicate to schizophrenia our second major premise, namely that crime is "normal" behavior. Here again, the statement is more exclusionary than positive, as it aims to deny aetiological primacy to structural personality defects. The normalcy contention, in this context, means that the difference in personality structure is not necessarily physiological and/or hereditary, but an outcome of the socialization process, so that personality differences between delinquents and the population at large are differences in degree and not of kind. Likewise, schizophrenia is an extreme condition, far removed from the slopes of the normal curve. But by adopting Sullivan's stance that schizophrenia is not a "disease entity" but a "grave disorder of living," we are coming close to the contemporary approaches, which regard the functional psychosis as a breakdown of interpersonal interaction and communication.²⁴

The definition of functional psychosis as the dissolution of the ego boundary may be fruitfully linked to the socio-cultural explanation of psychosis. We have dealt at length with the formation of the ego boundary and its function as an imaginary dividing line between our cognitive structure, which

synchronizes interaction and the outside world.²⁵ It is precisely this ego boundary that is being destroyed in psychosis. The dissolution here is in a reverse order, where the outer concentric circles of the ego boundary decay slowly or explode abruptly. The infantile ego core remains to take care of cognitive reality, which it is very poorly equipped to do. In severe cases of schizophrenia, the ego boundary is completely destroyed and the patient reverts to early childhood, to the pantheistic oral stage where no dividing line exists between him and the outside world.

Our present premise is linked to solid empirical observations. We could mention Rosenzweig's typology of reactions to frustration.²⁶ These are measurable personality traits, which in their significant form are present throughout an individual's life and which are believed to crystallize at the oral phase of development. The intropunitive type, who tends to blame himself for whatever frustrations and failures he may experience, would be more the "bad me" individual who has only himself to blame for the disappearance (destruction) of the good object (breast-mother). *Per contra*, the extrapunitive type would be more likely to form when the frustrating mother (object) is tangible out there and may be blamed for any misfortune and hardship. Our hypothesis is that the intropunitive type of personality would be fixed at the early pantheistic oral stage, whereas the extrapunitive type would be linked to a later oral fixation, when the ego boundary has been coagulated and separated from its entourage. This is rather important, because our highly theoretical and conjectural model, thereby, receives empirical reinforcement. It should be stressed that at this stage we are still concerned with the structure of a skewed mother-child interaction and not with its morbid results.

One of the most controversial of the skewed mother-child interactions, is denoted by G. Bateson as "double binds." In "Towards a Theory of Schizophrenia" (*Behavioral Science* 1956), he writes:

When the individual is involved in an intense relationship, that is, a relationship in which he feels it is vitally important that he discriminate accurately what sort of message is being communicated so that he may respond appropriately. And the individual is caught in a situation in which the other person is expressing two orders of message and one of these denies the other. And the individual is unable to comment on the messages being expressed to correct his discrimination of what order of message to respond. (p. 64-152)

In *A Review of the Double Bind Theory* (*Family Process* 2, 1963), Paul Watzlawick notes that the bind is a mutual one, binding two parties, two victims. He quotes Laing, who speculates on the early beginning of the double bind:

One must constantly remember, of course, that the child from babyhood may put his parents into untenable positions. This may occur in the early baby-mother interaction where the baby cannot be satisfied. It cries 'for' the breast. It cries when the breast is presented. Its crying is intensified when the breast is withdrawn. A mother unable to 'click with' or 'get through' to such a baby may become intensely anxious, and feel hopeless as a mother. She withdraws from the baby in one sense, while becoming over-solicitous in another sense. (p. 53)

According to Bowen, the infant and mother enter into a double bind of "being for each other"—the child "being helpless for the mother" and the mother "being strong for the child." When the child is devoted to "being for the mother," he loses the capacity of "being for himself."²⁷ Through this symbiotic tie, mother and child try to perpetuate the highly pleasurable stage in both their lives. Any further development or growth of the child threatens this symbiosis. What is crucial here is that we attach a different interpretation to this mother-child attachment. The fixation on early orality might prolong the pantheistic fusion of child and breast, create a double bind situation and arrest or injure "normal" development. However, as the double bind situations predispose a person to psychosis, we claim that this predisposition is related to the abnormal structure the ego boundary, which is characteristic of psychoses and caused, *inter alia*, by double binds. Yet this common denominator between double binds and psychosis is only a particular instance of the wider texture of participation. If psychosis, with its disruption of reality and twisting of cognition, is one of the end products of ontological participation, the double bind, with its hampering of the formation of the separating ego boundary and its prolongation of the child/mother pantheistic union, is a forceful technique of participation, of delaying the expulsion from Paradise.²⁸

We have denoted as double bind type A an inconsistent, ambiguous and amorphic mother-child interaction, where the mother does not know, does not feel or does not emphasize the needs of the child; where she tends to confuse his needs with hers; and where she develops a neurotic proximity with him, prolonging his early oral feeling of omnipresence. Consequently, a rather blurred and amorphic, and a very weak, ego boundary would be formed. A special case of this double bind is where the mother tends to react in an oscillating, inconsistent manner to the same basic needs and behavior of the infant. This would result in a corrugated, fragmentary and fimbriated ego boundary.

Double bind type B is one in which cognitive transmissions of acceptance are contradicted by covert transmission of rejection. In this case, the mother would voice and outwardly imitate the conventional gestures of a mother's behavior towards her infant; but in her *immediate* attitudes towards him, as expressed by empty, physical contact and other subtle ways of maternal

transmission of attitudes, she would reject the infant and convey to him her own anxieties, which would be translated by the adequately receptive infant as anxieties relating to his own being. At the nondifferentiated stage, the infant would regard these maternal transmissions as engulfing, sweeping badness which threatens to destroy everything. The resultant ego boundary would tend to be a negative one, filled with the annihilating tendencies towards the mother (breast-object) and the anxiety-laden guilt (badness) of the inadvertent destroyer. A special case of this type of double bind is scapegoating, in which the mother would send messages of rejection towards the child. On the other hand, his being a scapegoat makes him covertly needed as a receptacle for the scapegoating transmissions. This, no doubt, would be the major distinction between double bind type A, where the covert messages of annihilation are contrasted with the mother's cognitive attitude of acceptance, and the scapegoating, double bind type B, where the tags of badness, depersonalization and rejection conflict with the mother's need to retain the child as a receptacle for her own aggressive and sinister needs. Moreover, this subconscious attitude of rejection would clash with the scapegoating mother's overt gestures of acceptance, prescribed by her normative role of mother.

To sum up our present premise, we restate that scapegoating leads to a clash of (a) the tags of depersonalization, as internalized by the child and which form a negative ego boundary, and (b) the scapegoating dependence of the mother on the child, which makes for a forceful attachment of him to his mother. When internalized, such maternal need is displayed within the personality of the child as the hostile outside world. These two dissonant factors might also clash with whatever cognitive pressures the mother might direct towards the child. Such severe conflicts inherent in the scapegoating situation would result in a very strong ego boundary, separated from the outside world by many thick layers of scar tissue.


In double bind type A, some extreme maternal transmissions are contradicted in a rather consistent way, and generate a conflictual *gestalt* between the emerging self and its surrounding object-mother. These transmissions, which we have just described, make for a very strong ego boundary, rendering the self relatively immune to the incoming conflicting transmissions of reality, letting the delusional negativistic conviction of the paranoiac reign supreme. The extreme inversion of incoming stimuli is also supportive of our model, presented in the model shown below about the conflict between the "good" me and the rejecting object, inherent in the predisposition to paranoia. *Per contra*, in double bind type B, the autistic reaction has been hypothesized to be generated by a relationship between an absent or neglecting mother-object, so that the nascent self does not have a strong ego boundary. It is fixated on predifferentiated early orality, so that its relationship with reality is detached. This makes for a weak and amorphic relationship with the object

and, in keeping with our findings, its attitude towards the environment is undecided, erratic and resigned. This, indeed, is the typical profile of the autistic reaction, which is mainly characterized by a detachment from outer reality and the submerging of oneself in an inner reality not readily amenable to communication.

The paradigm presented in Figure 2 can be seen as a general guideline to our concluding remarks.

The autistic predisposition is related to a hazy and amorphous ego boundary, which becomes vulnerable to any outside pressure or trigger, which may catalyze the onset of morbidity. The relative indifference of the autistic schizophrenic to outside stimuli is, therefore, both a syndrome and the outward evidence for the weakness of his ego boundary. His difficulty in differentiating between himself and the object is a measure of his uncertainty concerning the strength and direction of the stimuli transmitted to him.

The paranoid reaction is explained by the "good me" surrounded by the "bad object," linked to interaction with a rejecting mother. This is related hypothetically to double bind type A, which generates a very strong conflictual relationship, and consequently a thick, robust ego boundary. We hypothesize that the ego boundary is generated by deprivational interaction and that when a severe conflictual relationship occurs, as is inherent in double bind type A, we may expect more and stronger scar tissue to cover the



nascent self in order to isolate it from painful outside stimuli. This hypothetical model of the paranoid predisposition is related to a later, post-oral fixation, because the coagulation and separation of the self happen here rather quickly. Because of harsher and more frequent injuries, the aggressive object is identified more readily, so that the differentiation between the “me” victim and the object as aggressor is more clearly perceived.

As for the psychopathic reaction, it may be what Cleckley calls the mask of sanity.²⁹ Cleckley claims that psychopathy in its true form is a morbid syndrome covered by a fragile facade of partial sanity, which collapses under pressure when the individual experiences a severe shock. Indeed, the interaction of the “good me” with an (absent) neglecting mother leaves a rather inchoate interaction with the bad object, which is not as potent as the actual deprivational interaction with a present mother or mother surrogate. The interaction with the bad object thus results in a partial ego boundary, in the sense that it has the outward appearances of a boundary, but is punctuated by gaps which make it vulnerable.

Finally, we have hypothesized depressive reactions as linked to the interaction with a rejecting mother at the early oral stage. This produces a “bad me” surrounded by a good object. This is the ideal intropunitive reaction, constantly reinforced by the aggressive object, whose authority to repress the “bad me” is legitimized by the core personality structure, which imputes positively to its surrounding object vis-à-vis its self-concept.

The interaction of psychotic patients with their families in institutional settings has triggered some etiological ideas on morbidity which are in line with our main theses and personality theory. Schizophrenia, for instance, may be envisaged as triggered by a disruption following a traumatic experience of a regulatory *Ity*, the entity which coordinates the dialectical interplay between the core personality vectors. The *Ity* is the mechanism, which sustains the ego boundary, however diffuse or traumatized it may be. However, when the stabilizing *Ity* is disrupted by the onslaught of schizophrenia, the developmental predisposition to morbidity sprouts up and takes over the psychodynamics of the personality. Consequently, the mental energy produced by the Tantalus Ratio (the dynamic interplay between the personality core vectors) *cathects* itself around the traumatized developmental fixations in a directionless cycle, or clogged set, activating part of the psyche and stalling the other parts, resulting in extreme cases in a complete autistic stupor or a paranoid outburst of object aggression, depending on the personality core fixations. In paranoid schizophrenia, the separant personality vector fixed on the object runs amok, without the checks and balances of a properly functioning participant vector or *Ity*, and pushes the patient to attack his surroundings with outbursts of disoriented aggression, accompanied very often by delusions and hallucinations. In the more autistic schizophrenics, the participant vector

engulfs the whole personality and enforces on it a disconnectedness with its surroundings. In the less severe forms of schizophrenia, the disruption and disconnectedness is fragmentary, so that the paranoiac focuses on one or more attributes of the object and inflates it into dislocated proportions, whereas the autistic schizoid may immerse himself into dislocated stimuli or objects, becoming oblivious to the rest of his surroundings.

It is interesting to note that our model of morbidity, which is far removed from the existing models of schizophrenia in the literature of psychiatry and clinical psychology, does have some common denominators, with a recent model of schizophrenia by J. Zubin and B. Spring. In *Vulnerability: A New View of Schizophrenia*,” they state:

It is assumed that exogenous and/or endogenous challengers elicit a crisis in all humans, but depending on the intensity of the elicited stress and the threshold for tolerating it, that is, one's vulnerability, the crisis will either be contained homeostatically or lead to an episode of disorder. (p. 103)

This sounds like a tautology but it is not. It expresses the point of view, which we also find adequate, that schizophrenia should be regarded as a dynamic combination of probabilistically expressed predisposing factors and triggering mechanisms, which catalyze the morbid condition. The authors use some flowery language and bold images to describe the onset of schizophrenia:

We might liken the occurrence of a coping breakdown to the development of a fault in the earth's surface. Ordinarily, a brief tremor will occur before a stable formation of the earth is reestablished, just as in the person's life a slight jar in the spheres of work and personal affairs will precede a new state of closure. On the other hand, if a bed of molten lava is seething below the crack in the earth's surface, the development of the fault will create an opportunity for the emergence of a volcano. In the vulnerable individual, a coping breakdown may open the way for the eruption of a psychopathological disorder. (p. 103)

This indeed is in line with our model of genesis, not so much of the autistic type of schizophrenia as of paranoiac morbidity, when the coordinating *Ity* crumbles down and the separant personality core vector is unleashed outwardly with a morbid fury. Indeed, when the regulating *Ity* is not in control of a separant personality predisposed to morbidity, the separant personality core vector runs wild. It assaults uninhibitedly the objects and others with the later oral quest of “swallowing” them. There are no significant participant checks and counter-balances from the enfeebled or dormant participant core personality vector, or the disrupted *Ity*, to make the violent separant personality core realize that it cannot “swallow” external objects in his surroundings. The

paranoiac thus develops a positive feedback cycle of increasing suspicion, augmenting hatred, of the evasive objects and people who do not tend to be controlled. This is accompanied eventually by delusions of dominion, hazy reminiscences of early developmental omnipotence.

WHERE ARE THE FIXATIONS FIXATED?

Personality traits and types are centered on the key concept of fixation, of Freudian origin. Unfortunately, neither Freud himself nor his disciples have sufficiently clarified for uninitiated outsiders the mechanisms of fixation, although it seems to be a central concept in psychoanalytic theory and practice. The original Freudian formulation is that libidinal energy is *cathected* towards the erogenic zones, which also represent the major psychosexual development phases.³⁰ However, when parents or their surrogates over-indulge an infant or severely deprive him at any given developmental phase, he will muster a relatively large amount of libidinal energy to overcome the resulting frustrations. He will also harness his libidinal energies to create alternative defensive outlets for the developmental growth processes, the “normal” manifestations of which have been blocked. Consequently, growth processes will be hampered at a given developmental phase, since the libidinal energies required to build the infant’s personality have been expended to erect defenses against the conflictual interaction with his parents. This “butter versus cannons” competition within the personality economy raises many questions that are not readily answered in the psychoanalytic literature. We do not propose to delve into extensive polemics, but one issue is highly relevant for our present purposes: What are the differential mechanics of a fixation caused by parental over-indulgence, *and are* linked to deprivational conflicts?

Our conception of the participatory vector presupposes an urge to revert back to an earlier developmental phase: the carefree irresponsibility of pre-puberty, the pantheistic omnipresence of early orality, the blissful suspended animation in the womb. Such a wish need not be reinforced by pleasant interaction with parents. If our premise here, partially based on Freud’s Pleasure Principle, is correct, we tend to be content because the satisfaction of our needs removes sensory irritation and tensions, bringing us nearer the blissful automatic satisfaction of wants within the womb. The same holds true for the sense of exclusiveness and omnipotence of the neonate at early orality. Consequently, the infant need not be cuddled to wish to remain at early orality, because the emerging of the separate self from the pantheistic togetherness is registered by the infant as an expulsion from paradise. This brings us to our interim conclusion: That a fixation cannot be effected by a contentedness incidental to a pleasure-giving parent-child interaction. Deprivation and fulfillment, pain and contentedness cannot have, to our mind, the

same or similar fixating effects. Only deprivation, an acute non-satisfaction of needs, or a traumatic injury may cause fixation.

We may well ask ourselves now what the dynamics of fixation are; otherwise, our theoretical of the Tantalus Ratio as a personality core mechanism will have some vague spots. Here, too, unfortunately, psychoanalytic sources are rather hazy, and Freud himself is not clear, taking too many things for granted. From *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life: The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* (1938):

The unconscious knows no limit. The most important, as well as the most peculiar, character of psychic fixation consists in the fact that all impressions are, on the one hand, retained in the same form as they were received, and also in the forms that have assumed in their further development. This state of affairs cannot be elucidated by any comparison from any other sphere. By virtue of this theory, every former state of the memory content may thus be restored, even though all original relations have long since been replaced by newer ones. (p. 50)

Freud's unconscious psyche seems to be the perfect databank, storing all impressions as well as all possible interactions of these interactions with past and future ones, in a timeless progression. A fixation is, then, some sort of anchor on a given point in the matrix of these impressions, but how this anchoring comes about Freud does not say. We propose, therefore, an explanation that is based on our exposition of the developmental phases of the personality core.³¹

Just as the coagulation of the self from the non-differentiated pantheism of early orality is effected by the deprivational interaction of the infant with external entities, the separation of the child from the cushioning of the family is brought about by socialization and normative rites of passage into puberty. If these processes, deprivational in essence, are more painful at a given developmental phase that the modal harshness (as measured by Ego's own experience), a rupture, a developmental wound, is formed, which psychic energies rush to mend. To be more precise: We have envisaged the developmental processes as an interplay between the separating forces of growth and interaction, and the participating urge to revert to an earlier developmental phase. The *cathected* energy resulting from the dynamic interplay between these vectors is the Tantalus Ratio. However, if the separating effects of the deprivational interaction were at a given space-time too intense, too violent, the developmental process is temporarily disconnected. The separating injury "has blown a fuse," short-circuiting the developmental process. The participation vector and *cathected* energies of the Tantalus Ratio repair the injury by covering it with developmental scar tissue, not unlike the scar on a wound. Yet the wound itself and tender coats of scar tissue are still exposed to conflict and more pressure, because the deprivational interaction of the na-

scant ego with its entourage is a continuous process. Consequently, the ever-thickening layers of scar tissue resulting from the traumas of the fixation are more like a corn on a toe. The *cathected* energy whirls around the traumatized developmental area, covering it with excessive mental imprints, analogously to the whirls and loops of the skin texture of the corn, which form a lump protruding from the texture of the skin. The corn is painful not just because of the pressure, but also because the excessive scar tissue makes it vulnerable. As a result of the trauma, the whole area is over-sensitive. This, on a rather low level of abstraction, illustrates the nature of fixation. It is a combined outcome of the traumatizing injury and excessive, frantic patching of layers of developmental scar tissue. The harsher the trauma, the thicker the layers of the defensive scar tissue. *This should be related to our analysis elsewhere of the formation of the ego boundary.*³² The separate ego emerges out of the non-differentiated early orality through its deprivational interaction with its breast-mother and its surrounding objects. The resulting boundary around the self is also a developmental scar tissue, but a fixation is an over-traumatized developmental experience, more conspicuous, more sensitive and consequently, more vulnerable than the rest of the developmental texture of the personality.

We should point out here that our conceptualization of fixation, in contradistinction to the Freudian usage, is not related to pathological regressions, but rather to the crystallization of character traits and personality types. We also hold that regression is not conditioned by fixation, but is a defensive flight to an earlier developmental phase, the longing for which is ever present in the participation vector of our personality core. When the dynamic balance of the Tantalus Ratio is disturbed by the separating pressures of growth, or its Ego's interpersonal relationships suffer a disturbing blow, the released counter-pressures of participation catapult Ego to visions of pre-pubic havens and blissful dreams of early orality. Fixation is, therefore, a developmental dam that traps both the disrupting blows of traumatizing interaction and the countering defenses of the Tantalus Ratio. The anchoring of personality traits on the fixation are the result of this massive concentration of painful experiences and the heaping of defenses in frantic disarray. One is aware of a hand or a tooth only when they are painful, and one always feels a blow on a sore, because the same impact on normal tissue is hardly noticeable. Consequently, the severity of fixation is related to the magnitude of the developmental trauma and the corresponding intensity of defenses mustered by the Tantalus Ratio. We have seen earlier³³ that the potency of the Tantalus Ratio is related to the age of the individual. What we are elaborating here is the premise that the intensity of the Tantalus Ratio is linked to the severity of fixation, which is linked in turn to character traits or types.

Birth is, no doubt, an explosive event, the archetype of which in mytholo-

gy is the act of creation itself; yet this colossal event is *not registered by a separate awareness*. Not until later orality does a separate self emerge out of a pantheistic mass and the “I” is confronted by distinct surrounding objects. This is the ontological base-line from which the inchoate being, i.e., the self, emerges out of the total being of early orality and the circumference of the separatum; the self is defined by the non-self, i.e., the object. This ontological revolution, registered by the individual as a separating catastrophe, is the basis of all Existentialist philosophy. Heidegger’s “*das sein*” and Sartre’s subjective “*pour soi*,” as contrasted with the object, the “*en soi*,” and the “*they*,” the *das man*. The Eigenwelt, the universe of the self, vis-à-vis the Mitwelt, the world of the others, and the Umwelt, the inanimate world of things.³⁴ It is also the basis for the most numerous typologies in the study of man’s personality. This is only natural because the ontological division between subject and object is as readily employed in psychological dichotomies, as the fact that man having ten fingers is the sole basis for the decimal system. The coagulation of the self thus marks the cut-off point for the most basic developmental dichotomy: From birth and early orality to the phase where the ego boundary is formed around the emerging individual separatum, and from later orality through the formation of the “ego identity” and beyond. In the first phase, any fixation that might transpire, and may thereby imprint character traits on the developing personality, is not registered by a separate self capable of discerning between the objects that are the source of the fixation-causing trauma, and himself as its recipient. The experiencing entity is a non-differentiated pantheistic totality. On the other hand, if the traumatizing fixation occurs at the later oral phase, after external objects have expelled the self from their togetherness by a depriving interaction with it, the self may well be in a position to attribute the cause of pain deprivation to its proper source, i.e., the objects. We propose, therefore, a personality typology that is anchored on the developmental dichotomy of pre- and post-differentiation of the self. The molding process is the nature and severity of fixation that in turn determines the placement of a given individual on the personality type continuum. However, the types themselves are fixed by developmental chronology: i.e., whether the trauma happened before or after the separation of the self. If the fixating traumas occur before the formation of the self, the result is a participant, or Tantallic, type. If the traumas fixate the personality after the coagulation of the self, the separant or the Sisyphean type is bound to emerge. Later we shall compare our proposed typology with some of the leading personality taxonomies in the literature. However, our typology’s main asset, in the present context, is that it relates to the Tantalus Ratio and our personality core vectors. The Tantallic type is participation bound-ever visualizing and longing for the autarchic all-inclusive early orality, while the Sisyphean type is ever entangled by the vicissitudes of the object.

Although Murray speaks of fixations within the womb,³⁵ the fetus is, of course, a non-differentiated entity, one possessing no self-awareness; the effects of fixations would be more conspicuous and decisive after birth and during the relatively short yet developmentally crucial period of early orality. After the differentiation of the self, the Sisyphian type may be fixed anywhere between later orality and post-adolescent puberty, when social norms finally enmesh the individual within the social identity of separation.

The main characteristic of the Tantallic-participant type, in contradistinction to the Sisyphian-separant will emerge in the course of our analysis, which will be conducted as follows. We shall first compare our typology with existing typologies. Our claim for innovation would have to be proved, in view of some rather close, yet superficial, similarities between our typology and other dichotomous typologies. Jung's celebrated Introversion/Extroversion typology, for instance, which Eysenck claims had been known and used in Europe hundreds of years,³⁶ seems to be very similar to our own, but on closer scrutiny we may see that its bases are entirely different. Introversion/Extroversion and its semantic equivalents anchor on the dichotomy of self-orientation and object-orientation. This can happen only after the self is already separate from the object. It is entirely different from the basis of our typology, which contrasts the total non-differentiation of early orality with the plurality of self, others and things from later orality onwards. Neither does Jung explain the developmental genesis of his types, so that his exposition is somewhat disconnected, while linking our typology to the developmental phases of the personality, by means of the dynamics of fixation.

The fixation of our polar types is related to the crucial phase of the crystallization of the self, which we have described elsewhere.³⁷ We have relied on the object-relations theorists, especially Klein, Fairbairn, Guntrip and Winnicott. These British "oralists" anchor their theorizing on the early and later oral phases, with a relative disregard for the later Freudian developmental stages. This, together with our own reliance on the separating transition from the pantheistic non-awareness of early orality to the emergence of the self, may serve as the theoretical foundation for the further elaboration of our premise. We have stated in our previous exposition that the deprivational mother-child interaction at the *early* oral stage is relevant not only for the process of the separation of the self, but also to the contents of its encompassing ego boundary.³⁸ A tense, anxious, "empty," absent mother, or a destroying "emptying" self are introjected into the nascent ego boundary and become "bad me." At the early oral phase, when the differentiation between the infant and his surroundings has barely commenced, the empty breast, the neglecting mother, the hard objects and the recurring discomfort are still all "me." A fixation at this stage would result in an ego boundary dominated by a self-image of badness.

It is in the nature of a continuum that as we move along it, one dimension increases and the other decreases. Therefore, any participant, except the ideal polar type, which does not exist, would have some covert separant traits lurking inside him. Also, the vector of the Tantalus Ratio, which operates in opposing to the fixed personality type, exerts hidden pressures that manifest themselves in the desire of one type to be involved in the activities of the diametrically opposite type. The enormity of this dialectic and its vast effect on human behavior has been subject of wild conjectures, but has not been adequately investigated; among the manifestations of this dialectic are the attraction of opposite types in sex, marriage and friendship.

We are well aware of the burden and formidable responsibility of the mother, for shaping the destiny of her child. She does this through her own behavior in matters that might appear insignificant at the time. Yet the mother determines fate through her communication with him in the early oral stage.

Any meaningful communication between the two polar types is exceedingly difficult. One type cannot comprehend the significance of the other type's actions. The participant, ever absorbed by ultimates, and deep truths, has difficulty understanding that the easy success of the separant in his social interactions has nothing to do with his abstract principles, ideological system or depth of thinking; that easy success is more often than not a result of the separant's easy smile and adeptness at flattery. For this very same reason, a separant who has been ousted or retired from his social position, or a social-climber whose name and aging face no longer appear in the gossip columns, collapses completely; he lacks the participant's interest in inner transcendence. He is a soap bubble supported by a shallow and fragile net of object relationships. When these collapse, a few drops of murky liquid are all that remain of his previous glory.

When we surveyed our population of patients we found that fixation was bimodal, a highly significant finding. Almost invariably we have encountered a double fixation, meaning very harsh treatment of the patient as a child, both in earlier and later orality, by either parent. The harshness had been punctuated by short periods of acceptance and over-protection. The outcome was that, so while the bimodal fixation both in early orality and later orality was effected, there was no integrated system-in-balance under the *Ity* given these extreme fluctuations and extreme erratic interrelationship. Consequently we almost invariably had these extreme fluctuations between a "bad me" attitude surrounded by a "good object," and an *undulation* of the object, up to delusive attributions to parents not only non-existent attributes but also delusions as to their basic attributes. This was generally accompanied by hatred, enmity and total rejection of the depriving mother-father object. Hence, in between this bimodal fixation there was an abyss. This "black hole" model could be presented as follows.

THE BLACK HOLE

We should stress that this bimodal fixation and lack of coordination creates what we have denoted as the “black hole,” which is constantly craving to be filled. This “black hole” model will be later applied to addiction and crime, and to predisposition to psychosis and depression. We should, however, point out that due to this *disruption* between the two *basic personality nuclei*, those of “good me” and “bad me” which are not coordinated, the drives and the mental energies can only be extreme, fluctuating between an “either or” kind of attitude towards the object. Hence, it is either total acceptance or total rejection. If one tries to fill the “black hole”—and the need is to fill it completely—and fails, a complete downfall may occur. In a sense, this is the dynamic reason underlying the internal saboteur expounded by the Kleinians, especially Fairbairn. We thus supplement the theoretical Kleinian structure, when we give a deep infrastructure, in the form of a dynamic background for the formation of the internal saboteur. This internal saboteur, taken by Fairbairn to be a kind of a dichotomy, which he observed in his patients and quite amply described, does not have any “reasons” as far as the dynamics of personality described by him. In our theoretical formulation, this reason is inherent in the “black hole” and “either or” attitude, related to the polar fixations of early and later orality.

We should stress that the difference between normalcy, morbidity, deviance and depression is a question of degree. If we say that the “black hole” can be filled in, so to speak, by addiction, crime, psychosis or depression, the choice of the various solutions would be related to the degree and extremity of the fixation *as one*, and the extremity of the behavior of the mother on the mother axis. If we have both an absent mother, or none at all, and a very extreme *later oral fixation, the tendency to find a solution, or in more expressive terms, to fill in the “black hole” by crime would be more imminent. If we are talking about the morbid solution, we have accepted Sullivan’s schizophrenia*³⁹ that envisages a range between inner directed mental violence, which results in autistic schizophrenia, to the overtly outward aggressive solution, resulting in paranoiac psychosis. Hence, we envisage a continuum between the upper right property space and the lower left property space in our model, which link (diagonally) the absent mother and the early oral fixation with the rejecting mother and the later oral fixation, *which is the paranoiac solution with the former which is the autistic solution*. However again, it is all a question of the degree of the fixation, which would be related to the type of criminal *It*y or morbid *It*y.

The same holds true for depression. If we take Seligman’s definition of depression as a learned helplessness, which in extreme cases becomes a psychosis,⁴⁰ we shall confine our theoretical analysis to very severe core personality disturbances, which would predispose to manic-depressive cyclic

psychosis, as well as severe drug addiction and crime. Our analysis will not deal with lesser structural personality defects, like schizoids and neurotics. We shall therefore deal with the extreme “either-or” types of reaction. Autistic digression would predispose the psychotic to annihilation, with resultant autism, which actually blots out any vestiges of the ego boundary, with the “hope” of reverting back to the “good object,” which of course is never achieved.

The paranoid solution would be the Promethean one—the destruction of the object. But since one cannot destroy the object without destroying oneself, one projects on it all kinds of hallucinatory paranoid projections, which in extreme cases are expressed in the paranoid building up of a whole new identity.

It is worth noting that *it* depends on the extent we can harness our mental energies to allow us to *dwell into* a psychotic breakdown, *whether a criminal solution or a depressive one*. In the autistic solution, if the fixation is strong enough and if the absence of any parent is extreme enough, the self, the ego-boundary is blotted out completely, with the hope of sinking back into the “good object.” Of course, this is an impossible venture, and the positive feedback cycle leads to a complete psychotic breakdown of the type of autism. On the other hand, the paranoid solution, if extreme enough, aims to blot out the object completely, and if this is impossible one envisages hallucinatory ways of blotting it out. The same goes for crime. The big shot criminal is, of course, a rare success in any legitimate society. Because there is no center, the center does not hold. If one cannot achieve, and become a big shot within the criminal framework, one directs all the fury to self-destruction.

In depression the dialogical solution is viable, because art is a dialogue. Art is not in the object; art is a relationship between the artist and the object. Art is in the processes of a relationship, and if the process is authentic, this viable artistic or creative interrelationship fills in the “black hole,” and gives meaning to the pains of depression.

DISCUSSION: THE INNOVATION OF THE “BLACK HOLE” MODEL

The main asset of our present monograph is that it tries both methodologically and contentwise to devise a dialectics of diversity in unity. We might envisage a number of methodological dynamics related to different types of morbid solutions, as well as to crime and depression. Yet, the unity relates to a model of *four property spaces*, so that by having the mother axis and the child axis intersect, we provide a matrix for a unified theory. Thus, the literal implication shows that the family dynamics of “double-binds” may be related to our paradigm, although its dynamics are content wise different from

the conflict situations which we have envisaged to be related to delinquent and criminal solutions.

As a summary, we make some concluding remarks, which may pertain to all four property spaces we have dealt with. This type of four-dimensional property space, which results from the intersection of the mother and child axes, may help us understand certain structural aberrations which lead to deviance and often crime, although they don't relate to actual core breakdowns like schizophrenia and manic-depression. We are addressing ourselves to certain sexual aberrations, which usually are in the realm of compulsion neurosis, and are peripheral, no core, aberrations.

Mother-child dialectics, in early and late orality, might result in sexual aberrations within the realm of the four property spaces. Consequently, we have provided a paradigm, which may serve as an underpinning for a theoretical explanation of crime morbidity and depression, although content wise, these phenomena are of course different.

We should like to point out that the unifying attributes of our present monograph are not only in the four property space model, but also in the initial bi-polar fixations of all three types of aberrations (crime, madness, and depression). These result in what we have denoted as the "black hole"—the center that does not hold between the two extreme poles of later and early oral fixation, with an abyss in the middle.

This abyss can be filled only by extreme alternatives: *either*, the immediate, if momentary, subjection to the overwhelming domination by drugs and alcohol; *or* the obliteration of the self in the autistic pole on the *continuum of schizophrenia*; as well as the delusional obliteration of the object in the paranoiac pole of the continuum.

As we have pointed out earlier, the Kleinian internal saboteur, especially Fairbairn, does gain a deeper explanatory insight through our theoretical explanation, or a deep personality core level, which provides the reason why this internal saboteur would make an appearance.

As for depression, not all depressives and deviants are creative, but if one is a creative depressive, his depression may augment the energy of creativity, since here too it is an all-or-nothing kind of solution. The depressive artist goes into a frantic phase of creativity, which could in a sense be described as manic. So long as this phase carries on he is not depressive, but once it ends, the depression sets in, and perhaps even reaches suicidal extremes.

The other unifying element in our model is the idea that the morbid criminal and depressive solutions are not alternative, but cumulative. We might well envisage a criminal who is both psychotic and depressive, as well as creative. In other words, one type of solution does not exclude the other. It might well be that a criminal-depressive *and rather paranoiac artist like*

Caravaggio, would indeed be very innovative so long as his spell of creativity lasted.

Being a criminal, one gets involved with the courts, the prison system and probation officers. Many services are harnessed to deal with him. In other words, one gets more attention being a criminal than just an unemployed social case on welfare.

Finally, it must be stressed that the four-property space model of morbidity, crime and depression, as well as the "black hole" model, are predisposition probability cases. The external trigger into madness and depression, like traumatic experiences such as loss of loved ones, would actuate the predisposition to morbidity. Likewise, the criminal predisposition would be actuated into crime by the processes of differential association, as expounded by Sutherland and others.⁴¹

NOTES

1. We accept the Kleinian framework as portrayed in M. Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," (1935) *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); and then later crystallized in M. Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," (1957) *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

2. S.G. Shoham, *The Myth of Tantalus* (St. Lucia: The University of Queensland Press, 1980); *Salvation through the Gutters* (New York: Hemisphere Publications, 1980); *Rebellion, Creativity and Revelation* (Northwood: Science Reviews Ltd.; New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1986).

3. S.G. Shoham, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, chapter 1.

4. Shoham, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, part 1.

5. Shoham, *The Myth of Tantalus*, chapter 1.

6. Shoham, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, pp. 141-142.

7. Shoham, *The Myth of Tantalus*, chapter 8.

8. Y.A. Cohen, *The Transition from Childhood to Adolescence* (Chicago: Aldine, 1964), p. 105.

9. Sifre Deuteronomy, 32.

10. A. Camus, *Myth of Sisyphus* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 3ff.

11. Shoham, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, chapters 4, 8, 13.

12. Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, vol. 2 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 26.

13. Shoham, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, part 1.

14. E.G. Schachtel, *Metamorphosis* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 60.

15. J. Bowlby, *Attachment* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), chapter 11.

16. This is the stand adhered to, inter alia, by Sullivan. See R. Munroe, *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* (New York: Holt, 1955), p. 360.

17. Fairbairn, *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* (London: Tavistock, 1966), chapter 11.

18. J. Piaget and B. Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 25ff.

19. Fairbairn, *Psychoanalytic Studies*, pt. 1.

20. Sigmund Freud, *Mourning and Melancholia* (Standard Edition 14, 1917).

21. C.R. Shaw and H.B. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1942); E.H. Sutherland and D.R. Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, 8th edition. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970).

22. M.E. Griffin, A.M. Johnson, and E.M. Littin, "The Transmission of Superego Defects." *The Family*, eds. L.E.F. Vogel and N.W. Bell. (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

23. F. Lidz and S. Fleck. "Schizophrenia, Human Integration and the Role of the Family." *Etiology of Schizophrenia*, ed. D.D. Jackson. (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

24. F. Mullahy, "Sullivan's Theory of Schizophrenia." *International Journal of Psychiatry* 6 (1967), p. 492.

25. S.G. Shoham, "The Tantalus Ration," *The Journal of Genetic Psychology* 126 (1974) 44-119.

26. S. Rosenzweig, "The Experiment Measurements of Types of Reaction to Frustration," *Exploration in Personality*, ed. H.A. Murray. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 99-585.

27. M. Bowen, "A Family Concept of Schizophrenia," *Etiology of Schizophrenia*, ed. D.D. Jackson (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

28. Shoham, *supra* note 2, *Salvation Through the Gutters*.

29. H.M. Cleckley, *The Mask of Sanity* (St. Louis: Misby, 1964).

30. This has mainly been presented by Freud in his *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex: The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Modern Library, 1938).

31. See Shoham, *supra* note 2, *Salvation Through the Gutters*; Shoham, *supra* note 2, *The Myth of Tantalus*, chapter 1.

32. See Shoham, *supra* note 2, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, part 1.

33. See Shoham; *supra* note 2, *The Myth of Tantalus*, chapter 1.

34. See L. Binswanger, *Being in the World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); M. Boss, *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

35. H.A. Murray, ed., *Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental of Fifty Men of College Age* (New York: Oxford Study University Press, 1938).

36. H. J. Eysenck, *The Biological Basis of Personality* (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas ed., 1967), p. 37.

37. Shoham, *supra* note 2, *Salvation Through the Gutters*, chapter 6.

38. The term "ego boundary" was coined by Federn to denote the division between the ego and the rest of the world; See P. Federn, *Ego Psychology and the Psychoses* (London: Imago, 1953).

39. H.S. Sullivan, *Psychoanalysis and Interpersonal Psychiatry* (New York: Science House, 1970).

40. M.E.P. Seligman, *Helplessness: On Depression, Development and Death* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975).

41. E.H. Sutherland and D.R. Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, 8th edition. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970).

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